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Torts-LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF
THEIR MINOR CHILDREN-Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1984)
Under current Florida case law, injured parties can state a prima
facie case of negligent supervision against the parents of a tort-
inflicting child only by alleging that the parents had knowledge of
their child's habit of doing the "particular type of wrongful act
which resulted in the injury complained of."1 The Third District
Court of Appeal, in Snow v. Nelson,2 criticized the narrowness of
this "particular acts" rule and proposed that it be abandoned in
favor of the analytical framework set forth in section 316 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. This note explores the analysis de-
veloped by the district court in support of its proposal. Then the
note briefly examines the common law theories of parental liability
for the torts of children and the opinion of the Florida Supreme
Court in Gissen v. Goodwill,3 which fixed the particular acts rule as
an element of the cause of action in negligent supervision. The
note explores the heritage of the rule, finds that it is derived from
a cause of action based on the theory of agency, and suggests that
it is therefore inappropriate to an analysis of alleged parental neg-
ligence in controlling the conduct of a child. Finally, this note dis-
cusses the policy considerations behind the rule and concludes by
urging the Florida Supreme Court to follow the recommendation of
the Third District Court of Appeal.
The injury that gave rise to the cause of action in Snow v. Nel-
son occurred as two teenage boys played a street game akin to
polo,4 in which croquet mallets were used to drive tennis balls in
the direction of a predetermined goal.5 Each boy struck his tennis
ball with his mallet, swiftly ran down the street after it, and hit it
again until the goal was reached.' In the course of the game one of
the boys, Mark Nelson, swung at his ball but accidentally7 struck
his competitor Randall Snow in the eye.8 As a result of the blow,
Randall ultimately suffered loss of the eye and permanent loss of
1. Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So. 2d 701, 705 (Fla. 1955).
2. 450 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
3. 80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955).
4. Brief of Petitioners on the Merits at 2, Snow v. Nelson, Fla. S. Ct. No. 65,391 (pend-
ing) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Petitioners].
5. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 270.
6. Id.
7. Brief of Petitioners at 4.
8. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 270.
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his senses of smell and taste.9 Randall's parents brought an action
in tort against Mark's parents and their liability insurer.'0 The
cause of action questioned the Nelsons' supervision of Mark in
light of their knowledge of his prior patterns of conduct and
whether any extant parental negligence in controlling Mark was
the legal cause of Randall's injuries."
Trial testimony indicated that Mark was slightly older and more
than a foot taller than Randall at the time of the accident. 2 Some
of Mark's neighbors and playmates testified that Mark played too
roughly with the smaller children who constituted the majority of
his playmates 3 and that Mark was a "bully."' 4 Prior to the acci-
dent, Mark's father had been made aware of his son's propensity
for rough play through reports from Mark's playmates. But Mark's
father had dismissed these accounts as "kids' tattling."' 5 Testi-
mony also revealed that Mark had invented the game in which
Randall was injured, and that Mark's father had seen his son play
that game or a similar version of it on prior occasions.'"
Following presentation of the evidence, Mark's parents and their
liability insurer moved for a directed verdict. 17 The trial court re-
served ruling on the motion until after retirement of the jury.'"
While the jury deliberated, the trial court ruled as a matter of law
that Mark's parents were not negligent 9 and accordingly granted
the motion for directed verdict.2 The jury returned a verdict for
Randall and his parents in the amount of $135,000.21 Applying
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. In its instruction to the jury, the trial court framed the issue for determination as
"[wihether the defendants were negligent in the supervision of their child, Mark Nelson,
and if so, whether such negligence was a legal cause of loss, injury or damage sustained by
the plaintiffs, Robert E. Snow and Cynthia Snow, as parents and natural guardians of Ran-
dall K. Snow." Brief of Petitioners at 4.
12. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 270.
13. Id. at 271.
14. Brief of Petitioners at 3.
15. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 271.
16. Brief of Petitioners at 4.
17. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 271.
18. Id.
19. Brief of Petitioners at 5.
20. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 271. The trial court allowed the jury to return a verdict and
determine damages even though a directed verdict was entered, so that in the event of a
reversal of the ruling, the jury verdict could be reinstated and the necessity of a new trial
avoided. Brief of Petitioners at 5.
21. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 271.
PARENTAL LIABILITY
Florida's doctrine of comparative negligence,22 the jury determined
that Mark's parents were seventy-five percent at fault.2"
On appeal, the Third District affirmed the lower court's judg-
ment.24 Judge Jorgenson, writing for the majority, first noted that
at common law, in principle, parents are not vicariously liable for
the torts of their minor children; no liability is recognized on the
basis of the parent-child relationship alone.25
The district court then reviewed the controlling case of Gissen v.
Goodwill,"6 wherein the Florida Supreme Court articulated four
"exceptions" to the common law rule of parental nonliability. 2
The first three exceptions provide that parents may incur liability
for their children's acts in some circumstances where dangerous in-
strumentalities, principles of agency, or parental participation are
associated with the wrongdoing.2 8 Under the fourth exception, lia-
bility may be incurred through negligent supervision, when parents
fail in their duty to "exercise parental control over [a] child al-
though. . . [they know] or in the exercise of due care should have
known that injury to another is a probable consequence [of such
failure]." 29 The district court viewed the fourth exception as a rec-
ognition of the "duty of a parent to exercise reasonable control
over the conduct of a child."3 The facts of the Snow case should
fall within the parameters of such an exception, in the district
court's view.31 Upon further review of the analysis and holding of
the Gissen opinion, the Third District found Florida's negligent
supervision exception to be constrained by a requirement that the
evidence show the child to have demonstrated a " 'habit of doing
the particular type of wrongful act which resulted in the injury
complained of.' ",32 Apparently, then, under the district court's in-
terpretation of the rule in Gissen, a prima facie case of negligent
supervision is stated only where injury results from parents' failure
to take reasonable steps to protect others from an unreasonable
risk of harm created by their child's known propensity to perpe-
22. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
23. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 271.
24. Id. at 270.
25. Id. at 271.
26. 80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955).
27. Id. at 703.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 271.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 273 (quoting Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 705) (emphasis added).
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trate a particular kind of wrongful act.
In accordance with this view of the controlling law, the district
court reluctantly affirmed the trial court's order granting the mo-
tion for directed verdict.3 3 However, the court criticized the nar-
rowness of the Gissen rule and urged that it is "not supported by
the weight of authority." 4 The court questioned whether any rule
strictly limiting the negligent supervision theory by a requirement
of proof of a specific precedent course of conduct has ever had a
sure foundation in the case law, notwithstanding the views of an-
notators, encyclopedists, and reporters to the contrary. 5 Rather,
Judge Jorgenson suggested, courts have taken an ad hoc approach
"limited only by the broad bounds expressed in the Restatement
[(Second) of Torts section 316]. ' '38 Under the Restatement's artic-
ulation of the negligent supervision theory, parents are " 'responsi-
ble for [the] conduct [of their children] in so far as [they have] the
ability to control it,' . . . and have the 'opportunity' and know of
'the necessity of so doing' . . .,.
The Third District proposed that the Florida Supreme Court
abandon the particular acts limitation on the negligent supervision
theory of parental liability, in favor of a "more enlightened" rule
based purely upon the language of the Restatement.3 The district
court certified the following question as one of great public impor-
tance: "To what extent and in what manner may parents be held
legally responsible for injuries inflicted by their minor children
upon third parties?"3 9
I. COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY BASES OF PARENTAL LIABILITY
Under the common law, the parent-child relationship alone is in-
sufficient to give rise to parental liability for the torts of children. 0
Children are considered separate legal individuals, susceptible of
suit in their own right.41 Since children usually are judgment proof
due to lack of financial responsibility, damages inflicted by them
33. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 275.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 271-72.
36. Id. at 272.
37. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965)) (citation omitted).
38. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 275.
39. Id. The question was certified and jurisdiction of the supreme court accepted pursu-
ant to FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
40. See Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1955); Bankert v. Threshermen's
Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 150, 152 (Wis. 1983).
41. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 123, at 913 (5th ed. 1984).
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have gone largely uncompensated."' This harsh denial of compen-
sation has been ameliorated through decisional and statutory law
holding parents legally responsible, under certain circumstances,
for the torts of their children.
Four principal theories of parental liability are recognized by the
common law.4" These theories rest upon two distinct bases: (1) vi-
carious liability for some fault of the child, and (2) direct liability
for some fault of the parents, independent of any fault of the child.
The crucial distinction between vicarious and direct liability lies in
the location of the fault. The foundation of vicarious liability rests
not on the fault of the parents who are held legally responsible,
but on some fault of the child who committed the wrongful act.""
Under the theory of direct liability the reverse is true: The child
actor need not be at fault in any way, for liability is founded upon
some fault of the parent.45
Vicarious liability is invoked under the principles of agency and
under the authority of statute. Where a child is employed by his
parents and acts within the scope of that employment, the parents
are liable for the child's tortious acts under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior.4" Vicarious liability arises because of the principal-
agent or master-servant relationship, not because of the parent-
42. Id.
43. The court in Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 703, articulated the four common law theories
under which a parent may incur liability for the tort of his child:
1. Where he intrusts his child with an instrumentality which, because of the
lack of age, judgment, or experience of the child, may become a source of danger
to others.
2. Where a child, in the commission of a tortious act, is occupying the relation-
ship of a servant or agent of its parents.
3. Where the parent knows of his child's wrongdoing and consents to it, directs
or sanctions it.
4. Where he fails to exercise parental control over his minor child, although he
knows or in the exercise of due care should have known that injury to another is a
probable consequence,
For broader discussions of the first, second, and third theories, see generally Freer, Parental
Liability for Torts of Children, 53 Ky. L.J. 254 (1965); Kent, Parental Liability for the
Torts of Children, 50 CONN. B.J. 452 (1976); Comment, Liability of Negligent Parents for
the Torts of Their Minor Children, 19 ALA. L. REV. 123 (1966); Note, Torts: Parents and
Child: Liability of Parent for the Torts of Minor Child, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 643 (1934); Com-
ment, Parental Liability for a Child's Tortious Acts, 81 DICK. L. REv. 755 (1977); Note,
Parent's Failure To Prevent Torts by Child, 31 TENN. L. REv. 553 (1964); 67A C.J.S. Parent
& Child §§ 122-124 (1978).
44. See Snow, 450 So. 2d at 272 n.3.
45. Id; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 comment c (1965).
46. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 41, § 123, at 914; Harper & Kime, The Duty
To Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 893 (1934); Comment, Parental Lia-
bility for a Child's Tortious Acts, supra note 43, at 760.
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child relationship.47
All fifty states have adopted "parental responsibility" statutes
which impose vicarious liability upon parents in some circum-
stances for property damages or personal injuries caused by chil-
dren's acts.4s Florida has such a statute, limited to restitution for
malicious or willful theft or damage to tangible property. 49 Paren-
tal responsibility statutes establish and define the legal duty of
parents to control the conduct of their children. The two central
purposes of the statutory duty are (1) to provide more reliable
sources of compensation to tort victims by spreading losses among
a greater number of individuals and their insurers, and (2) to deter
tortious juvenile acts by encouraging modification of parental be-
havior toward the taking of "precautionary action." 50 These stat-
utes are advantageous to plaintiffs to the extent that they obviate
the difficulties associated with establishing a legal duty of control
under the common law.5 1
The second basis of legal responsibility under the common law,
direct liability, supports three theories of recovery. Parents may
47. See, e.g., Grimes v. Hettinger, 566 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (parent who in-
structed his children to supervise other children who were guests at swimming party at his
private residence would be liable under principles of agency for any negligence on the part
of his children).
48. Note, Statutory Vicarious Parental Liability: Review and Reform, 32 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 559, 565 n.41 (1982) (citing every state parental responsibility statute); see also
Prescott & Kundin, Toward a Model Parental Liability Parental Responsibility Act, 55
IOWA L. REV. 1037 (1970). Under most parental responsibility statutes, liability is imposed
only for children's intentional torts. Note, supra, at 566.
For discussions of statutes imposing criminal liability upon parents for their children's
torts, see Reagan, A Constitutional Caveat on the Vicarious Liability of Parents, 47 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 1321 (1972); Comment, Parental Responsibility Ordinances-Is Criminalizing
Parents When Children Commit Unlawful Acts a Solution to Juvenile Delinquency?, 19
WAYNE L. REV. 1551 (1973).
49. Under FLA. STAT. § 741.24 (1983), parents may be liable in an amount up to $2,500
for actual damages resulting from the malicious or willful theft or destruction of tangible
property by their unemancipated minor children. The constitutionality of this statute was
upheld in Stang v. Waller, 415 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). See also FLA. STAT. § 322.09
(1983) (imposing vicarious liability on parents or guardians who sign their minor child's
application for a state driver's license for any negligent or willful misconduct of the child
when driving a motor vehicle upon a highway; such signers become jointly and severally
liable with the child for any damages resulting from the child's misconduct).
50. See Note, supra note 48, at 574-79 (discussing the various purposes attributed to
parental responsibility statutes by commentators, legislatures, and the courts).
51. One commentator has suggested that the passage of parental responsibility statutes
is responsive to the "difficulties of proof inherent in the common law theories of recovery."
Kent, supra note 43, at 465. Indeed, the statutes remove the most problematic of the obsta-
cles to recovery under the common law theories-proof of the existence of a legal duty of
parents to control the conduct of their children.
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incur direct liability where they entrust or through their negligence
make available to their children instrumentalities likely to be used
so as to pose an unreasonable risk of harm to others.2 Parents who
participate in their children's tortious acts through their consent
to, direction, or ratification of the acts are held directly liable as
joint tortfeasors.5 The negligent supervision theory is also based
upon direct liability. Under this theory, parents incur joint and
several liability for their own negligence in failing to exercise their
duty to control the conduct of their children."
Liability under theories of respondeat superior, statutory paren-
tal responsibility, and negligent entrustment and supervision is in-
curred through a breach of a duty by the parents to take precau-
tionary action with regard to the conduct of their children for the
protection of others. The crucial question and point of tension
stemming from the disparate views expressed in the decisional,
statutory, and model laws governing parental liability concerns
what conditions must be met before this limited legal duty arises.
II. THE PARTICULAR ACTS LIMITATION ON THE PARENTAL DUTY OF
CONTROL: THE RULE OF Gissen
In Gissen v. Goodwill,55 the Florida Supreme Court for the first
time considered the circumstances under which the parents of mi-
nor children could be held legally responsible for torts committed
by their children. While the Goodwills and their eight-year-old
52. See, e.g., Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1977). The court held that a
cause of action was stated against the manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer of a slingshot
purchased by a young boy who used the slingshot to fire a pellet that struck his playmate in
the eye. The court remarked that "[t]he common law has long recognized that a parent or
other responsible adult who entrusts a potentially dangerous instrumentality to a child may
be subject to liability." Id. at 767. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 308, 390
(1965).
53. See, e.g., Langford v. Shu, 128 S.E.2d 210 (N.C. 1962). The court held that a cause of
action was stated against a mother who "approved and participated in the practical joke her
children played on the plaintiff .... " Id. at 213. Though the court employed the expres-
sion "negligence" in its opinion, the analysis and holding are based upon principles of
agency.
54. See, e.g., Bankert v. Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Wis. 1983).
The court in Bankert distinguished negligent entrustment from negligent supervision or
control where a child obtains an instrumentality which has proven to be dangerous in his
hands. Negligent entrustment connotes an affirmative act on the part of the parents in giv-
ing the child access to the instrumentality. Id. Negligent supervision may result from "fail-
ure to exercise ordinary care in allowing the instrumentality to be in the hands of a child,"
or from failure to give proper instruction or to warn of the hazards associated with its use.
Id. at 153-54.
55. 80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955).
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daughter were guests at the Gaylord Hotel in Miami Beach, their
daughter allegedly swung a door against a hotel employee "with
such great force and violence . . . that the middle finger on the
. ..[employee's] left hand was caught in the door and a portion of
said finger was caused to be instantaneously severed and fell to the
floor."
The injured hotel employee brought an action naming both the
child and her parents as defendants.5 The employee's complaint
against the parents was brought on a theory of direct parental lia-
bility for negligence in the supervision of their minor child.5 8 The
complaint averred that the Goodwills had failed in their duty to
exercise discipline and control over the child in light of their
knowledge of her prior course of "reckless and mischievous con-
duct." '59 The employee further alleged that the injury he sustained
was a probable consequence of the course of conduct of the child,
and that in failing to restrain the child's conduct, the parents sanc-
tioned, ratified, and consented to the wrongful act.6 0 According to
the complaint, the girl had on previous occasions committed "par-
ticular acts . . . about the hotel premises, such as striking, knock-
ing down and damaging objects of furniture and furnishings and
disturbing and harassing the guests and employees of the hotel
... 'I61 The complaint further stated that the girl had committed
"intentional acts of a similar nature to the act committed against
the plaintiff" with the design or result of injury to other persons.2
The trial court ruled the employee failed to "state a cause of ac-
tionable negligence against the. . . parents . . . for injury inflicted
by their minor child ....
On appeal, it was necessary for the supreme court to adopt a
principle defining the limits of parental liability. Since this was a
case of first impression in Florida, 4 the court looked to the com-
mon law of other jurisdictions, treatises, and the Restatement of
Torts as persuasive authority. The court articulated four "broadly
56. Id. at 702.
57. Id. Only the liability of the parents was at issue before the supreme court. In an
earlier proceeding, the supreme court dismissed the minor child as a party to the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction over the person. Gissen v. Goodwill, 74 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1954).
58. Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 702.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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defined exceptions" to the common law rule of nonliability65 and
recited in dictum the provisions of section 316 of the Restate-
ment.66 Directing its attention to the theory of negligent supervi-
sion, the supreme court reviewed seven cases from other jurisdic-
tions6 7 and ordained that a cause of action under that theory is
stated only when it is alleged that parental negligence flows from
failure to restrain the child from his or her "habit of doing the
particular type of wrongful act which resulted in the injury com-
plained of."' 8 Since the Goodwills' child was not alleged to have
previously demonstrated a "propensity to swing or slam doors at
the hazard of persons using such doors," ' the court's threshold
particular acts requirement was not met, and any finding of paren-
tal negligence was precluded as a matter of law. Accordingly, the
trial court's dismissal for failure to state an actionable cause of
negligence was affirmed.70
A. The Heritage of the Rule
The supreme court in Gissen adopted a "particular acts" rule
after determining that it was a "common factor" among the cases
it surveyed. 1 However, in its opinion in Snow, the Third District
questioned whether the sources and cases cited in the Gissen opin-
ion actually stand for the proposition given them.72 The district
court further opined that the Gissen holding is not supported by
the weight of authority.73 Even if the rule is sustained by the
weight of authority, the district court would criticize its narrow-
ness. The supreme court was strongly urged to reject the requisite
satisfaction of the particular acts rule as a condition to a finding of
legal duty and liability, and to replace it with the broader and
more flexible standard set forth in the Restatement.
The body of case law in the early twentieth century became rife
65. Id. at 703.
66. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 316 (1934)).
67. Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 703-05. The cases cited were: Ryley v. Lefferty, 45 F.2d 641
(N.D. Idaho 1930); Martin v. Barrett, 261 P.2d 551 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953); Ellis v.
D'Angelo, 253 P.2d 675 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Bateman v. Crim, 34 A.2d 257 (D.C.
1943); Steinberg v. Cauchois, 293 N.Y.S. 147 (App. Div. 1937); Condel v. Savo, 39 A.2d 51
(Pa. 1944); Norton v. Payne, 281 P. 991 (Wash. 1929).
68. Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 705 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 706.
71. Id. at 705.
72. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 272.
73. Id. at 274-75.
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with confusion as courts struggled to find the proper basis for pa-
rental liability.7' In the first quarter of the twentieth century,
courts were not careful to segregate the characteristics and lan-
guage of the causes of action based on agency from those of the
developing concept of an independent tort of negligence. 75 Later
courts were inattentive and inaccurate in their retrospective char-
acterizations of cases, giving unquestioned recitations of holdings
from cases in which the distinction between the two theories either
had not been fully developed or had already been eroded.76 Some
of the language traditionally associated with the theory of agency,
notably the references to particular habits and acts, thus became
improperly ingrained in courts' analyses under the theory of negli-
gent supervision.
The characteristics of the agency theory, derivative of the an-
cient yet pervasive theory of liability arising from the master-ser-
vant relationship, are embodied in the Gissen opinion's third ex-
ception to the common law rule of parental nonliability.77 A
principal who expressly or impliedly authorizes a tortious act of his
agent is jointly and severally liable with the agent for the resulting
damages. 78 One court explained that liability may be found where
a parent (as principal) " 'has knowledge of the wrongdoing and
consents to it, where he directs it, where he sanctions it, where he
ratifies it or participates in the fruits of it,' because then 'he be-
comes in effect a party to it.' -7 The authority or consent for the
wrongful act was "found in [the] actual presence of the parent, in
express or implied direction, or in a precedent course of con-
74. See Harper & Kime, supra note 46, at 895.
75. See, e.g., Thibodeau v. Cheff, 24 Ont. L.R. 214 (Div. Ct. 1911), wherein a negligence
count was charged when a father failed to control his son's habit of carrying matches and
starting fires. The child, who was retarded, started a fire which destroyed a wheat stack.
The court viewed the matches as dangerous instruments in the hands of the minor. Id. at
220. The court remarked that "the father is not liable for torts committed without his au-
thority, express or implied .... " Id. at 221. The court further stated that "the father is
liable for the conduct of his young child, if he knows of the child's frequent wrongdoing in a
particular direction, and, by his attitude or his inaction . . . he indicates his willingness that
the misconduct should be repeated." Id. In finding the father's inaction to be adequate
proof of his countenance that the child's habit should continue, the court in Thibodeau
merged the requirements of the negligence and participation theories of liability, at least to
the extent that both require a showing of a precedent course of conduct.
76. See, e.g., cases collected in Parsons v. Smithey, 489 P.2d 75, 77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971).
77. See supra note 43.
78. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 41, § 52, at 346; J. SALMOND, THE LAW OF
TORTS 106 (7th ed. 1928); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
79. Corby v. Foster, 29 Ont. L.R. 83, 91 (1913) (quoting Thibodeau, 24 Ont. L.R. at 218).
19851 PARENTAL LIABILITY
duct."' 0 With some notable exceptions, the principal is said to be
not liable for "unauthorised torts committed by [his nonservant]
agent [acting] in the course of his agency."81
Professor Wigmore, in reviewing the history of the locus of re-
sponsibility for tortious acts, stated that in sixteenth and seven-
teenth century English common law, a master was generally re-
sponsible only for an act of his servant which he commanded in
advance of the act, or to which he consented (or assented) before
or after the act.82 Interestingly, Professor Wigmore further identi-
fied a "refinement" of this rule, evident in some of the cases of this
period, as a "doctrine of Particular Command."83 Under this doc-
trine the master is liable only where he "commanded the very act
in which the wrong consisted . ".8.."4 Professor Wigmore stated
that, carried to its "logical extreme," the doctrine would provide
that a "master should be liable .. .only when the deed in all its
details had been expressly and specifically commanded."" Thus,
the "principle of responsibility for servants' or agents' doings"
would be sharply limited. 6
The analogy, if not the legacy, of the doctrine of particular com-
mand with respect to the rule of Gissen is inescapable. But the
argument that the particular acts rule should have no place in the
80. Smith v. Jordan, 97 N.E. 761, 761 (Mass. 1912).
81. J. SALMOND, supra note 78, at 106; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250
(1958). A principal is liable, however, for the unauthorized tort committed by his agent
where he "subsequently ratifies and assents to the act so done." J. SALMOND, supra note 78,
at 107. The rule is stated that "authority subsequent is equivalent to an authority prece-
dent." Id. For the ratification to be effective, the wrongful act must have been "done on
behalf of the principal" (i.e., he must have benefited by it), id., and the principal must have
known "the nature of the act" which was thus done on his behalf. Id. at 108 (emphasis
added).
Thus, in Beedey v. Reding, 16 Me. 362 (1839), a father was held liable when his children
on three separate occasions used his team to carry away the plaintiff's wood. The court
found that the children's repetitive course of conduct was sufficient to' sustain an inference
of the parent's knowledge of the acts. In failing to return the wood, the parent adopted or
approved (ratified) his children's tortious acts and thereby became a party to them.
Further exceptions to the rule that a principal is not liable for unauthorized torts commit-
ted by his agent are discussed in W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 41, § 70, at 508.
82. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History (pts. 1-3), 7 HARv. L. REV.
315, 383, 391, 441 (1894).
83. Id. at 392; see also W. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (1896) (appar-
ently restating Professor Wigmore's view without acknowledgement).
84. Wigmore, supra note 82, at 392.
85. Id.
86. Id. In the eighteenth century, the courts realized the injudicious nature of the nar-
row limits of liability under the doctrine of particular command and reacted by creating the
"rule of Implied Command from a General Command or Authority," id. at 394, a precursor
to the modern "scope of employment" doctrine. Id. at 399.
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analysis under a theory of negligent supervision is most convincing
when one realizes that all seven of the cases cited by the court in
Gissen as tending to support the propriety of the rule were in fact
decided on principles of agency and master-servant liability, and
not on the modern negligence theory.8 7 Any language regarding
"negligence" in the text of these cases is merely accessorial to the
fundamental notion of agency that the parents are viewed as par-
ticipants and therefore co-tortfeasors with their children, rather
than independent tortfeasors. In point of fact, the excerpted analy-
ses and language cited by the court in Gissen in support of its rule
do indicate that the child's "habit of doing the particular type of
wrongful act" was a "common factor" among the cases. 8 However,
these cases, applying the principles of agency and master-servant
liability, will not support the court's conclusion that the particular
acts limitation on parental liability is proper to a cause of action
alleging parents' independent negligence.
Norton v. Payne9 involved a suit brought on behalf of a five-
year-old child who suffered injury to an eye when struck with a
stick wielded by a seven-year-old playmate. The complaint in neg-
ligence against the defendant parents alleged their knowledge and
encouragement of their child's "habit of striking smaller children
in the face with sticks."9 0 Adopting the "results and .. .reason-
ing" of Thibodeau v. Cheff1 and Johnson v. Glidden,92 both of
which were decided on agency principles, the court in Norton held
that a cause of action in negligence was stated."
The court in Ryley v. Lafferty94 held that a cause of action was
stated against the parents whose minor child allegedly lured a
smaller child into a secluded place, undressed him, and then beat
him.9 5 The complaint averred that the resulting injury followed a
precedent course of conduct of which the defendant parents had
knowledge.96 The parents were accused of having encouraged the
conduct by resisting admonitions by others that the child be con-
87. See generally infra notes 89-130 and accompanying text.
88. Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 705.
89. 281 P. 991 (Wash. 1929), cited in Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 704-05.
90. Norton, 281 P. at 991.
91. 24 Ont. L.R. 214 (Div. Ct. 1911).
92. 76 N.W. 933 (S.D. 1898).
93. Norton, 281 P. at 993.
94. 45 F.2d 641 (N.D. Idaho 1930), cited in Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 705.
95. Ryley, 45 F.2d at 642.
96. Id. at 641. The child who inflicted the injuries was alleged to have demonstrated a
habit of luring smaller boys into secluded places and assaulting them. Id.
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trolled.9 7 The court in Ryley stated, as a general principle, that
"the parents are liable if it appears that they knew that their child
was guilty of committing the particular kind of tort habitually
and encouraged the child. . . and made no effort to correct or re-
strain him."9 8 This language is characteristic of the agency theory,
under which an implicit grant of authority to do the tortious act
extends from the principal-parent when he has actual or imputed
knowledge of his child-agent's precedent course of conduct, fails to
exercise control over that behavior, and thereby countenances that
the misconduct should continue.99 The contribution of the court in
Ryley to the confusion in the body of case law governing parental
liability lies in its indiscriminate use of the word "negligence." The
court stated that the parents' "[h]aving full knowledge of their
child's habits, traits, and vicious disposition, and encouraging him
. ..to continue such acts, would constitute assent and participa-
tion on the part of the parents. . . and, if so, it would be regarded
as negligence .... "100 It is unfortunate that the court used the
term "negligence" in this context, for at no other place in the lan-
guage of the opinion was the term invoked; the modern conception
and standard of negligence was not applied by the court in its
analysis. The cause of action was brought on a theory of agency,
not negligence.101
The case of Steinberg v. Cauchoisl02 involved an action against
the parents of a young boy who operated his bicycle on a sidewalk
and struck another child, injuring her.103 The complaint alleged
that the boy's parents "had received notice of his conduct in [reck-
97. Id. at 641-42.
98. Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
99. See Thibodeau, 24 Ont. L.R. at 221 (court explained that "the father is liable for the
conduct of his young child, if he knows of the child's frequent wrongdoing in a particular
direction, and, by his attitude or his inaction . . . he indicates his willingness that the mis-
conduct should be repeated").
100. Ryley, 45 F.2d at 642.
101. The court revealed that the agency theory formed the basis of its analysis when it
stated:
To encourage the child the parents must signify their consent to a continuation of
their child's conduct, or direct or ratify the act, or that the child was at the time
acting as their agent or servant in their interests or for their benefit. Under such
circumstances the parent could be liable under the doctrine of adoption of tort
[i.e., ratification].
Id. Interestingly, the only authorities cited by the court in Ryley in support of the analysis
and statements of the law in its opinion consisted of two agency-based cases: Norton v.
Payne, 281 P. 991 (Wash. 1929), and Thibodeau v. Cheff, 24 Ont. L.R. 214 (Div. Ct. 1911).
102. 293 N.Y.S. 147 (App. Div. 1937), cited in Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 703-04.
103. Steinberg, 293 N.Y.S. at 148.
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lessly] operating [his bicycle] on prior occasions" and that their
failure to attempt to control the conduct had made it possible and
probable that the boy's conduct would lead to the injury.0 4 The
court noted that the "complaint in effect alleged negligence" of the
boy and his parents.'0 5 Finding that the evidence was insufficient
to justify parental liability,' 8 the court affirmed the trial court's
judgment against the boy and reversed its judgment against his
parents. 0 7 The court in Steinberg adopted passages from Harper's
Law of Torts, detailing the circumstances under which parents
may incur liability for their children's torts. 08 Under Professor
Harper's fourth scenario, a parent may be liable when his negli-
gence consists "entirely of his failure to reasonably restrain the
child from vicious conduct imperiling others, when the parent has
knowledge that the child has a propensity toward such conduct."' 09
Harper's inclusion of a "known propensity" limitation on the the-
ory of parental negligence is attributable to his reliance on two
agency cases to support his articulation of that theory-Ryley and
Norton.1 0 The interesting paradox of the Steinberg case is that
the appellate court reversed and dismissed the complaint, notwith-
standing the plaintiffs' allegations of the parents' knowledge of
their child's propensity to perform the very act which ultimately
resulted in the injury.
The court in Condel v. Savo"' held that a cause of action in
parental "negligence" was stated in a complaint alleging that the
parents failed to control their child's known "mischievous and
reckless disposition '  and his habit of assaulting smaller chil-
dren." 3 Relying on Norton v. Payne"' and Thibodeau v. Chef," 5
the court in Condel juxtaposed the language and analysis of the
104. Id. at 149.
105. Id. at 148.
106. Id. at 149.
107. Id. at 150.
108. F. HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 283 (1933). Professor Harper's artic-
ulation of the exceptions to the common law rule of parental nonliability is essentially the
same as that of the court in Gissen, see supra note 43, except for his articulation of the
theory of parental negligence.
109. F. HARPER, supra note 108, at 623.
110. Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641 (N.D. Idaho 1930); Norton v. Payne, 281 P. 991
(Wash. 1929), cited in F. HARPER, supra note 108, at 623 n.43.
111. 39 A.2d 51 (Pa. 1944), cited in Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 704.
112. Condel, 39 A.2d at 53.
113. Id. at 52. The defendant's child was alleged to have thrown the plaintiff's child
down a steep embankment, resulting in a fractured leg.
114. 281 P. 991 (Wash. 1929).
115. 24 Ont. L.R. 214 (Div. Ct. 1911).
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negligence theory with that of the agency theory.11
The courts in Bateman v. Crim"7 and Martin v. Barrett1 made
the inevitable jump in logic which led later courts to seal the par-
ticular acts rule upon the heart of the prima facie case of parental
negligence. As opposed to the line of cases holding that a cause of
action was stated where known habitual misconduct was alleged,
these courts dismissed the causes of action for failure to allege
such a habit."' The Bateman case involved a suit for personal in-
juries brought by an elderly woman against two boys and their par-
ents.12 0 The boys were playing football in the street, in violation of
an ordinance, when one of the boys collided with the woman, who
was walking on an adjoining sidewalk. 12' Though the complaint
was premised on the independent negligence of the parents in su-
pervising their children, the court took a different approach, citing
Ryley and other agency cases122 for the proposition that liability is
imposed where parents "have knowingly permitted, encouraged, or
failed to discourage, conduct inherently dangerous to others or
prohibited by laws intended to promote public safety.' 23 The cen-
116. The court began with an invocation of the negligence theory, stating that parental
"liability arises from failure to exercise the control which they have over their child when
they know, or in the exercise of due care should know, that injury to another is a natural
and probable consequence .... " Condel, 39 A.2d at 53. Then, in the same sentence, the
court added the laguage of the agency theory and concluded that "such failure to act and
restrain the child amounts to an approval and sanction of, or consent to, his acts by the
parents." Id.
117. 34 A.2d 257 (D.C. 1943), cited in Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 703.
118. 261 P.2d 551 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953), cited in Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 704-05.
119. Martin, 261 P.2d at 553. The holdings of these courts comport with the rule of
agency stated supra in text accompanying note 78.
120. Bateman, 34 A.2d at 257.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 258 n.1.
123. Id. at 258. By adopting a "knowledge" standard, the court effectively precluded any
analysis of the parents' independent negligence. The knowledge standard falls within the
province of the agency theory, where the parent becomes a participant by consenting to the
tortious act. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
The plaintiffs' proposed framework for analysis of the negligent supervision claim was
rejected by the court in light of its adoption of a prior course of conduct requirement. The
plaintiff had suggested that
a lack of proper supervision, without evidence of prior conduct requiring the exer-
cise of parental restraint, renders a parent responsible for acts of a minor which
with greater supervision would not have occurred, and . . . whether sufficient su-
pervision was exercised in a particular case is a question of fact for the jury.
Bateman, 34 A.2d at 258. The problem with this formulation is that it would nearly always
be true that, in retrospect, greater parental care and supervision could have prevented the
child from inflicting injury. See Holodook v. Spenser, 324 N.E.2d 338, 343 (N.Y. 1974). This
standard would thus be systematically manipulable by plaintiffs.
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tral question arising from this rule is: "What evidence must be
shown to satisfy the element of knowledge?" The court invoked
the precedent course of conduct doctrine of agency theory124 as the
method for imputing knowledge to the parents. The court found
that the evidence did not show that the boys had previously played
football in the street.12 5 Under the stated rule of the court, paren-
tal knowledge was not shown, and therefore liability could not be
imposed.12
Martin v. Barrett27 involved a suit in which negligence was al-
leged against parents who entrusted an air rifle to their twelve-
year-old son. The son discharged the gun and put out the eye of
another boy. The court synthesized language from two agency-
based cases '2  and announced a rule apparently intended to apply
in all cases where parental responsibility was at issue. 129 That the
analysis of the court in Martin is steeped in principles of agency is
further revealed by the court's finding that the plaintiffs' allega-
tions of parental participation in the child's tortious act were in-
sufficient to state a cause of action. °30
124. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
125. Bateman, 34 A.2d at 258.
126. In addition to the rule adopted from the agency cases, the court also stated its
opinion that parents' negligence in supervising their child "must have some specific relation
to the act complained of .... Id. Presumably, the court would require that the very act of
the child which caused the injury must have been foreseeable to the parents, with foresee-
ability determined by whether the child had demonstrated the same conduct on a prior
occasion.
127. 261 P.2d 551 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
128. Id. at 552. Martin cited Hagerty v. Powers, 5 P. 622, 622 (Cal. 1885), for its rule
that "a father is not liable in damages for the torts of his minor child committed without his
knowledge, consent or sanction and not in the course of his employment of the child"; and
Ellis v. D'Angelo, 253 P.2d 675, 679 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952), for its proposition that
a parent will incur liability for his minor child's intentional acts of violence or
damage to persons or property if, knowing of the child's vicious or destructive
tendencies or acts, he fails to exercise reasonable measures to restrain or discipline
the child and thus encourages or acquiesces in such misconduct on the part of the
child.
The rule of Hagerty is framed in terms of agency theory. The language taken from the Ellis
opinion was itself directly quoted from Annot., 155 A.L.R. 87 (1945). The cases cited by the
author of the annotation in support of his statement of the law include Ryley, Steinberg,
Condel, Norton, and Johnson. Thus, the rule of Martin, if viewed as bearing on the theory
of independent parental negligence, is tainted by its incorporation of the characteristics of
the agency theory.
129. [B]efore a cause of action may be stated against the parents for the tort of a
child it must allege a specific known course of misconduct by the minor involving
his habitual, intentional, and specific wrongful acts against other parties and the
parents' failure to take proper precautions to guard them against said acts.
Martin, 261 P.2d at 553.
130. Id.
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The particular acts rule, as an element of the prima facie case of
parental negligence, has been uncritically and ritually recited
through the chain of decisions in many jurisdictions."'l Even the
notes following section 316 of the second Restatement reveal that,
in the Reporter's view, a precedent course of conduct may be prop-
erly associated with an analysis of parental liability under the Re-
statement.32 It may be said that the rule is well settled; it may not
be said, however, that such a rule is justified by a mere succession
of unquestioned recitations. If the Florida Supreme Court wishes
to maintain a policy of limited parental responsibility, it need not
do so by retreating behind a wall of empty syllogisms. The court
should state its policy forthrightly and implement that policy by
rational means.
B. Application of the Rule in Florida
The Florida district courts have had several encounters with the
Gissen decision. One court gave a limited reading to Gissen, deter-
mining that it was not controlling in cases brought on the theory of
negligent entrustment."' 3 Conversely, another court affirmed the
dismissal of a negligent entrustment case for failure to allege pa-
rental knowledge of the child's prior particular acts.13' In two
cases, district courts have reversed lower court orders of dismissal
for failure to state a cause of action, where prior particular acts
were alleged.1 35 Additionally, two courts have avoided the Gissen
131. See, e.g., cases collected in Parsons v. Smithey, 489 P.2d 75, 77 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1971).
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 reporter's notes, app. at 21-24 (1966).
133. Bullock v. Armstrong, 180 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965), cited in Snow, 450 So. 2d
at 274 n.7, involved a question of the liability of a mother who instructed her five-year-old
child to push a baby stroller through a crowded department store without her supervision,
where the stroller knocked down the plaintiff, causing personal injury. The mother defended
under Gissen's requirement that the parent must have "knowledge of the child's habit of
committing the type of act involved and the failure to take proper precautions to guard
against such acts." Bullock, 180 So. 2d at 481. The Second District held that a cause of
action was stated in negligent entrustment. The court reasoned that since Gissen was de-
cided on a theory of negligent supervision, a showing of a particular act was not elemental to
a cause of action based on negligent entrustment.
134. The complaint in Spector v. Neer, 262 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), alleged pa-
rental negligence in entrusting matches to a minor child which resulted in fire damage to a
building. Applying the rule of Gissen, the district court held that the complaint was prop-
erly dismissed for failure to allege that the child "had a habit of doing the particular type of
wrongful act which resulted in the injuries .... " Id. at 690.
135. The case of King v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instr., 286 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA
1973), involved an action by a student who was assaulted and injured by other students in a
school restroom. The district court held that a cause of action in negligent supervision was
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rule when it might have been applied, and allowed the question of
parental liability to be presented to the jury.13 The court in Snow
viewed the last-mentioned cases as implicit rejections of the
rule. 3 '
In Seabrook v. Taylor,3 1 the Fourth District sustained a jury
verdict finding the parents negligent for failure to "exercise the
due care and caution under all the circumstances shown, including
the placing of a loaded pistol in a place where their fourteen-year-
old son had access to it during times of unsupervised activity."' 39
The controversy arose when, following a quarrel, young Seefus Sea-
brook removed a pistol from a closet in his parents' bedroom and
shot and injured two of his playmates. 4 0 The Fourth District held
that the question of parental negligence was "properly submitted
to the jury,"1 even though there was no showing that the child
had a habit of taking and using the gun. Stating that Gissen's four
classifications of circumstances where liability may be found were
not exclusive," 2 the court avoided the Gissen rule by determining
that the question of the parents' liability should be analyzed in
light of "the whole of the circumstances pertaining to the accessi-
bility of the very dangerous loaded pistol and the probability of
injury to others from it."' 4 3 Thus the court in Seabrook employed
a broader approach to parental liability than a strict reading of
Gissen would allow.
The Seabrook approach was followed by the Third District in
Southern American Fire Insurance Co. v. Maxwell.'" That case
stated against the school board under the in loco parentis doctrine, where the plaintiff al-
leged that similar assaults had been committed on prior occasions.
The court in Wyatt v. McMullen, 350 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), held that a cause
of action was stated where the plaintiff, who was injured by a shot from a BB gun fired by
the defendant's son, alleged negligent entrustment and supported the claim with allegations
of prior unsupervised and dangerous use of the gun. One unusual twist in the Wyatt case
concerns the parties against whom the action was held to have been stated. The child who
fired the shot and his natural mother were living in the household of a Mr. Smith, who was
made a defendant under the in loco parentis doctrine. The child had borrowed the gun from
a six-year-old friend who, together with his parents, was also named a defendant.
136. Southern Am. Fire Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 274 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Sea-
brook v. Taylor, 199 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967).
137. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 274.
138. 199 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967).
139. Id. at 318.
140. Id. at 316-17.
141. Id. at 318.
142. Id. at 317.
143. Id. at 318.
144. 274 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
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turned on the question of parental liability for personal injuries
suffered by an elderly woman pedestrian who was struck from be-
hind by a five-year-old bicyclist on a sidewalk where the woman
was walking.145 The child had had little experience in riding her
new bicycle without the benefit of training wheels when her par-
ents permitted her to ride out of their sight and supervision.'46 The
trial court sent the question of parental negligence to the jury even
though no dangerous propensities of the child were or reasonably
could have been alleged. 1 7 Following the broad approach of the
court in Seabrook, the Third District affirmed that the facts of the
case posed a question for the jury.'48 The court avoided application
of the Gissen rule by focusing not on whether the child's prior
course of conduct had given the parents sufficient notice to raise a
factual issue of negligence, but on whether an issue of negligence
was raised by the parents' alleged failure to ascertain whether their
child "was competent to control the bicycle without
supervision." 149
The Snow majority poignantly remarked, "If the facts in Gissen
were not sufficient for a determination that the child's course of
behavior would naturally and probably result in injury, what facts
could be?"'150 This rhetorical question underscores the court's dis-
satisfaction with the narrowness of the Gissen rule. The Snow ma-
jority would prefer a "more enlightened" approach to parental lia-
bility based purely upon the Restatement. In a dissenting opinion,
however, the broader liability rule endorsed by the majority was
criticized as not necessary on account of any obstacles raised by
the Gissen holding. 51 Rather, the dissenting judge urged that the
facts alleged in Snow were sufficient to state a prima facie case of
negligent supervision under the Gissen rule. He would have em-
ployed a two-part analysis to determine whether the evidence
presented in the case of Snow gave rise to an issue of fact. If the
evidence indicated that "(1) [the] defendant parents knew of their
child's habit of assaulting smaller children while at play, and (2)
the parents condoned such conduct by expressions of resentment
or resistance to admonition by others," then, in the dissenter's
145. Id. at 580.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 581.
149. Id.
150. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 274.
151. Id. at 275 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
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view, the jury verdict should stand.15' While this analysis would
appear to parallel the analysis of the Gissen court, it fails to satisfy
the Gissen rule in two crucial respects. First, the initial question
draws the wrong "habit" into the calculus. The court in Gissen
identified the habit which caused the injury as a "propensity to
swing or slam doors at the hazard of persons using such doors." '153
Allegations of the Gissen child's other wrongful acts against per-
sons and property were considered insufficient to state a cause of
actionable parental negligence. In order to be properly aligned with
the fact pattern and analysis of Gissen, the first question of the
dissenting judge's formula should ask whether the evidence showed
that Mark had a propensity to swing polo sticks at the hazard of
other persons playing the street game of his invention. The record
reflects no such allegations.
The second flaw in the initial question lies in the use of the term
"assault." In both criminal and civil law the offense of assault re-
quires a manifestation of intent."' The petitioners admitted in
their brief that Randall's injury was accidentally inflicted.155 Thus,
Mark's act was at most one of negligence and not intention. Even
if it were shown that Mark had a habit of assaulting other chil-
dren, such acts would have no bearing on the cause of action
against Mark's parents. This is because, under the narrow rule of
Gissen, parents' knowledge of their child's propensity to do one
kind of wrongful act does not give sufficient notice of the necessity
to intervene to prevent the child from doing a different kind of
wrongful act.1 56 The dissent in Snow would have limited the
Gissen holding to "those cases where a plaintiff fails totally to
plead a relationship between specific conduct of the child which
causes injury to another and a lack of restraint on the part of the
parents.' 1 57 He argued that the pleadings and facts of Snow were
sufficient to satisfy the Gissen requirements. The dissenting judge
152. Id. at 276.
153. Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 705.
154. See Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 171 So. 214, 217 (Fla. 1936) (defining
civil assault); FLA. STAT. § 784.011 (1983) (defining criminal assault).
155. Brief of Petitioners at 4, Snow.
156. In dictum the court in Gissen expressed a policy forbidding transfer of the knowl-
edge element of parental negligence from one genre of the child's wrongful acts to another.
The court said that "[t]he deed of a child, the enactment of which results in harm to an-
other and which is unrelated to any previous act or acts of the child, cannot be laid at the
door of the parents simply because the child happened to be born theirs." Gissen, 80 So. 2d
at 705.
157. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 275 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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cited evidence of Mark's propensities "to be rough at play with
smaller children," and "to assault smaller children at play."'' 5 Fur-
ther, he argued, Mark's parents knew of these propensities and yet
failed to restrain Mark from such conduct. 59 Again, the alleged
habits relied upon by the dissenting judge are too general under
the Gissen holding to have given adequate notice to the parents
that the conduct of their child posed an unreasonable risk of harm
to others, and that injury would probably result from their failure
to restrain their child from that conduct. The analysis advanced in
the dissenting opinion cannot be reconciled with the policy estab-
lished by the court in Gissen. The particular acts rule serves as a
limitation on duty and liability which will not yield before allega-
tions of general incorrigibility. Indeed, the likelihood of a finding
of parental liability under Gissen is directly proportional to the
specificity of the alleged propensive act.
III. NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION ANALYSIS UNDER THE Restatement
A. The Legal Duty of Control
Under the Restatement view, the legal duty of one to act affirm-
atively to attempt to control the conduct of another for the protec-
tion of a third party is limited and arises only where special rela-
tionships exist among the parties. 60 The duty does not arise
merely because one realizes or should realize his action is necessary
for the protection of another. 61 The duty is conditioned upon the
status of the relationship and upon one's actual or constructive
knowledge of the ability, necessity, and opportunity for the exer-
cise of control. 6 2 The breach of such a legal duty, once arisen, is in
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See generally Harper & Kime, supra note 46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
315 (1965) provides:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between
the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the
third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the
other which gives to the other a right to protection.
See, e.g., Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479 (Minn. 1980).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) provides: "The fact that the actor
realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection
does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action."
162. See id. § 316 (Duty of Parent To Control Conduct of Child); § 317 (Duty of Master
To Control Conduct of Servant [outside the scope of employment]); § 318 (Duty of Posses-
sor of Land or Chattels To Control Conduct of Licensee). Cf. § 320 (Duty of Person Having
Custody of Another To Control Conduct of Third Persons).
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the nature of nonfeasance,' and the omissive harm is actionable
in negligence.
The Restatement recognizes a limited duty of parents to control
the conduct of their children."" Once the conditions are met, the
parents have an affirmative duty to act with reasonable care to
control their children's conduct to protect others from intentional
or unreasonable risk of harm.1
5
B. Application of the Restatement Standard
The Restatement view has received qualified acceptance in sev-
eral jurisdictions.'66 Two courts, however, have applied the Re-
statement analysis in pure form. The supreme courts of Arizona 6 7
and North Carolina16 have embraced the Restatement analysis
without requiring proof of a specific precedent course of conduct as
a precondition to legal duty. These opinions demonstrate that
under the Restatement analysis, parents receive ample protection
from unwarranted liability and that judicial intrusion into parent-
ing choices is minimal. Yet, these analyses are preferable, because
in focusing on the primary negligence of the parents, without the
necessity of finding fictitious parental participation in the tort, the
integrity of the distinct causes of action is preserved. Under this
approach to parental liability, the interests of both plaintiffs and
defendants are more rationally and effectively served.
In Parsons v. Smithey,16 9 the Supreme Court of Arizona consid-
ered for the first time the liability of parents for personal injuries
inflicted by their children.1 0 The plaintiffs alleged that the boy
163. Harper & Kime, supra note 46, at 887.
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Wiltfong, 604 P.2d 79, 82 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979); Nolechek v.
Gesuale, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (N.Y. 1978). But cf. Wintercorn v. Rybicki, 397 N.E.2d 485,
487 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (noting that Restatement position has not been adopted in Illinois);
Lanterman v. Wilson, 354 A.2d 432, 436 (Md. 1976) (court decided not to allow cause of
action based on negligent supervision); Davis v. DuBosch, 583 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Or. 1978)
(court decided not to decide whether the Restatement rule was applicable).
Courts in some states have coupled a precedent course of conduct requirement with their
analyses under the Restatement, just as the Florida Supreme Court did in Gissen. See, e.g.,
Parsons v. Smithey, 489 P.2d 75, 77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971), vacated, 504 P.2d 1272 (1973);
Convery v. Maczka, 394 A.2d 1250, 1253 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
167. Parsons v. Smithey, 504 P.2d 1272 (Ariz. 1973).
168. Moore v. Crumpton, 295 S.E.2d 436 (N.C. 1982).
169. 504 P.2d 1272 (Ariz. 1973). For a broader discussion of Parsons, see generally Ari-
zona Appellate Decisions, 1973-74, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 649 (1974).
170. Parsons, 504 P.2d at 1274. The suit arose after a 14-year-old boy attacked a mother
and her daughter in their home with a hammer, knife, and belt buckle, causing personal
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suffered mental disturbance and that his parents should have rea-
sonably foreseen from their child's previous "aggressive behavior"
that he would "cause violent injury to other. ' 171 In response to this
allegation, the defendant parents asserted the plaintiff's failure to
prove that the child had evinced a habit of committing the particu-
lar type of wrongful act which resulted in the plaintiffs' injuries.1 72
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants on this is-
sue. 17  The intermediate appellate court adopted the particular
acts rule and then reversed the trial court, finding that some evi-
dence which may have borne on the parents' alleged knowledge of
their son's propensity was improperly excluded from trial.1 7" The
supreme court rejected the defendants' contention that parents'
awareness of the need to control their child could be raised only
through their child's previous exhibition of the particular kind of
wrongful act which caused the plaintiffs' injuries.1 75 The court
stated that " '[T]he injury must have been the natural and proba-
ble consequence of the negligent act, that is, a consequence which,
under the surrounding circumstances, might and ought reasonably
to have been foreseen as likely to flow from such act.' "1 " Rather,
the court noted, "to adopt the stringent rule of excluding all but
the specific similar acts to prove knowledge would most often leave
the first of the most violent and vicious acts uncompensated.' 7 7 In
evaluating the negligence issue, the Arizona Supreme Court em-
ployed the ordinary rules of negligence and the language of the Re-
injuries. Id. at 1273. The victim of the attack sued the boy's parents, alleging negligence in
their failure to exercise control over the conduct of their minor son. Id.
The plaintiffs also sued under Arizona's parental responsibility statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-661 (1956), which provides that parents are vicariously liable for the malicious or
willful misconduct of their minor child resulting in any injury to the person or property of
another. At the time of the suit, such liability was limited to $500. That limit was extended
to $2,500 in a 1980 amendment. See historical note following § 12-661.
171. Parsons, 504 P.2d at 1275.
172. Id. at 1275-76.
173. Id. at 1273.
174. Parsons v. Smithey, 489 P.2d 75, 77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971). The court of appeals
cited Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955), in support of its finding that allegation
of a habit of doing a "particular type of wrongful act which resulted in the injury com-
plained of" had been a salient common factor among similar cases from other jurisdictions.
Parsons, 489 P.2d at 77 (emphasis added).
175. Parsons, 504 P.2d at 1276.
176. Id. at 1275 (quoting National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Freschi, 393 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1965)).
177. Parsons, 504 P.2d at 1277. The court noted that "many types of evidence may be
relevant" to establish parental knowledge of the child's disposition to perform a certain kind
of wrongful act. Id. at 1276. The court stated that all evidence which tended to make the
child's propensity "readily apparent" to the parents was relevant for this purpose. Id.
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statement. Paradoxically, the supreme court affirmed the trial
court's directed verdict, finding that all the evidence, both admit-
ted and excluded at trial, was insufficient to raise a question of fact
for the jury 'of whether the boy's parents "should have reasonably
foreseen that [their son] had a disposition to perform such a vio-
lent act. '178
In Moore v. Crumpton,179 the pivotal question of a parent's
knowledge of the necessity for exercising control over his child was
again determined on the basis of the broad standard of negligence
permeating the provisions of the Restatement. The Supreme Court
of North Carolina focused its analysis on the independent negli-
gence of the father, and whether the evidence showed that he
"knew or in the exercise of due care should have known of the
propensities of the child and could have reasonably foreseen that
failure to control those propensities would result in injurious con-
sequences." 180 The court stated that the particular injury which re-
sulted need not have been foreseeable, but "merely that conse-
quences of a generally injurious nature might have been
expected." 8 1 The court expressed this inquiry under the general
standard of negligence-whether the parent "exercised reasonable
care under all of the circumstances. 1 82 The court in Moore made
no mention of a particular acts requirement. It is apparent from
the opinion that no such allegation would have been required. The
court examined all the circumstances leading to the injury, includ-
ing the child's general character and propensities, and the parent's
response to those attributes. The court ultimately determined that
two of the conditions necessary for duty and liability to arise under
the Restatement were not met; the parent had neither the requi-
site knowledge of his ability nor knowledge of the necessity to con-
trol the child.183 The court in Moore accordingly ruled, as a matter
178. Id. at 1277.
179. 295 S.E.2d 436 (N.C. 1982). Moore involved a civil suit by a rape victim against the
parents of her 17-year-old assailant. The rape was committed in the middle of the night,
while the minor child was under the influence of whiskey and controlled substances. Id. at
439. The child had had a history of drug abuse and academic problems. Id. at 438-39. The
child's parents had previously sought treatment for him from mental health professionals,
including a psychologist and psychiatrist who told the parents the child "was not disposed
toward violent or dangerous behavior .... ." Id. at 439.
180. The supreme court affirmed summary judgment for the mother of the assailant.
The mother was separated from the child's father and did not have custody over the child at
the time of the assault. Id. at 441-42.
181. Id. at 440.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 443. The court reasoned that the state's inability to control the 17 year old's
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of law, that the father of the minor child could not be found liable
for negligence.""
Under the analyses of the courts in Parsons and Moore, it is ap-
parent that even if the Florida Supreme Court should adopt the
Restatement position absent the particular acts rule, it is unlikely
that liability would be found in the Snow case. The general allega-
tions that Mark Nelson's father knew that his son tended to be
rough at play or that he was a bully would no doubt have some
bearing on the court's analysis. However, it does not appear that
these allegations would be sufficient to impute to Mark's father the
knowledge of the risk, nor to show his ability, the necessity, or the
opportunity to exercise control over the child for the protection of
others.
IV. THE POLICY OF THE RULE
No matter how solid the positive case law pedigree of the partic-
ular acts rule, the justification for its continued existence must rest
upon claims of fairness and efficiency in furthering a policy of very
restrictive parental liability. The purpose of the rule, or any other
rule that might be substituted for it, is to define the point at which
a parent will be considered charged with knowledge that injury to
another is a probable consequence of his failure to act to control
his child's conduct. It thus provides a threshold for the finding of
liability under the traditional principles of negligence associated
with the duty of one person to exercise his consensual or status-
based power to control the risky acts of another.
The particular acts rule functions as an expression of a strongly
held choice to limit parental liability. Much of the injustice and
confusion of the doctrine stems from latent judicial fears of em-
barking upon a description of the reasonably prudent parent's du-
ties of discipline, inquiry, and supervision, because that would im-
plicate a full-fledged account of normative child development. Any
exposure of parents to liability for the torts of their children is
behavior by threat of severe criminal penalties indicated that the ability of the parents to
control the child must also be limited. Id. at 442. Since experts had determined that the
child was not committable to an institution, the parents' ability to control the child was
further reduced. Id. at 443. The court also relied on the fact that the rape occurred in the
middle of the night while parents are normally sleeping; parents cannot be expected to
watch their children 24 hours a day. In addition to the parents' apparent inability to control
the child, the court found that the parents had little reason to know of the necessity to
control the child. Clinical and medical experts had advised the parents that there was no
reason to foresee that the child would harm himself or others. Id. at 442.
184. Id. at 443.
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imagined by the hypothesizing mind-set of legal decision making
to encourage parental repression of the activities in which children
are allowed to engage. The relative degree of parental restrictive-
ness must (in this domain of legalistic psychology) correspond to
the extent of the parents' exposure to liability. Courts express their
reluctance to allow liability rules to affect parenting choices with
the slogan that parents are generally not considered insurers of
their children's torts.185 Any extension of parents' liability subjects
them to the expense of insurance to cover the heightened risk of
loss due to an unfavorable judgment; but even more grievous, it
intensifies the burden of worry for the improvidently uninsured
parent.
As a method for effectuation of a policy of limited liability, the
particular acts rule is at once analogous and contrary to the fore-
seeability component of the doctrine of proximate cause. Both the
rule and the doctrine of foreseeability act as mechanisms by which
the bounds of liability are defined and limited. Under the concept
of proximate cause, liability for damages resulting from negligence
has been limited to those damages which reasonably could be fore-
seen to flow from the natural and probable consequences of an act
or omission. 18 The foreseeability component of the doctrine of
proximate cause is now universally understood as no more than a
device employed by courts to limit liability on the basis of pol-
icy." 7 The particular acts rule serves precisely this same pur-
pose-to provide a limitation on liability based on policy. How-
ever, unlike the flexible foreseeability component of proximate
cause, the particular acts rule draws a bright line, rigidly marking
the point at which liability may be imposed in all cases. Under the
particular acts rule, foreseeability is determined on the basis of the
parents' actual or constructive knowledge of the child's prior
course of conduct evincing a habit of doing the particular kind of
wrongful act which led to the injury complained of. Parents are
thus afforded sufficient opportunity to take steps to restrain the
child from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others and to
avoid damages which would otherwise result. A determination of
negligence, then, is based on whether the parents acted reasonably
under the circumstances, with legal duty and liability limited by
185. See Patterson v. Weatherspoon, 225 S.E.2d 634, 637 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
228 S.E.2d 453 (N.C. 1976).
186. See generally Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Kellog, 94 U.S. 469 (1869); W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, supra note 41, § 43.
187. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 41, § 42, at 273.
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the doctrine of foreseeability, which in turn is determined by the
proof of prior particular acts.
The bright line approach to parental liability provides consis-
tency and predictability and, to that extent, fairness. However, as
with all bright-line tests, this liability rule is inherently both
under- and over-inclusive in its scope when measured against the
underlying community values embodied in the principle of liability
for foreseeable harms created by unreasonable failure to exercise
care in the use of parental authority. Such a high threshold re-
quirement for liability is unfair in that it precludes any determina-
tion by a jury unless a plaintiff can meet a very high burden of
proof that the parent is specifically responsible. Under the rule of
Gissen, any failure of a complainant to allege a prior course of con-
duct virtually identical to the conduct which caused the damage is
considered a pleading defect, subjecting the suit to the probability
of adjudication as a matter of law, rather than fact. In keeping
most cases from the jury, the rule prevents incorporation of the
standards of the individual community in the judicial process. '
As a matter of policy, the rule does not encourage parents to re-
duce the risk of harm to others.
V. CONCLUSION
The particular acts rule manifested in the Gissen holding is an
unnecessary and overreaching limitation on parents' liability for
negligent supervision of their children. Though Gissen's particular
acts rule may be supported by the weight of authority, the heritage
of that authority is of questionable repute. The provisions of sec-
tion 316 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provide adequate
protection to parents and at the same time provide a better frame-
work for legal analysis than is possible under the arbitrary limita-
tion of the particular acts rule. The cases of Parsons and Moore
demonstrate that the plaintiff's burden under the Restatement is
sufficiently difficult in that only the most obvious and egregious
incidents of parental negligence would allow a possible jury deter-
188. See Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1977) where the court stated:
The preference for jury resolution of the issue of negligence is not .. simply an
expedient reflecting the difficulty of stating a rule that will readily resolve all
cases; rather, it is rooted in the belief that the jury's judgment of what is reasona-
ble under the circumstances of a particular case is more likely than the judicial
judgment to represent the community's judgment of how reasonable persons
would conduct themselves.
Id. at 763.
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mination of liability. The Florida Supreme Court should follow the
suggestion of the Third District and the example of the supreme
courts of Arizona and North Carolina. The particular acts rule
should be removed from the framework of analysis under the the-
ory of negligent parental supervision. The court should adopt the
Restatement view of legal duty and liability in its pure form.
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